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Abstract: This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream 
collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures 
(RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show 
that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of 
RJV-participating firms, which is also necessary and sufficient for a decrease in consumer 
welfare. Using information from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a 
market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D 
expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors –
created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time – are conducive to 
collusive outcomes in the product market which reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs 
among non-competitors are efficiency enhancing.   
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1. Introduction 
Joint R&D activities – such as research joint ventures (RJVs) – are a prominent 
phenomenon especially in many high-tech sectors of the economy, as they hold the 
potential to increase efficiency and promote innovation, which raises welfare and 
benefits consumers.1 As a result, RJVs are frequently stimulated by governments 
around the world. At the same time, it is well-known that the benefits of R&D 
collaborations need to be re-assessed if such activities are used to achieve product 
market collusion. In other words, there exists a trade-off between upstream R&D 
cooperation and downstream competition if they are causally linked.  
This paper tests whether research cooperation leads firms to coordinate in 
product markets using data available through the US National Cooperation Research 
Act (NCRA). The NCRA was introduced in 1984 to raise US competitiveness, in 
particular vis-à-vis Japanese firms. US firms were encouraged to establish research 
links, even if they were competitors in downstream product markets (Link, 1996; 
Jorde and Teece, 1990). Specifically, firms in NCRA-RJVs were granted milder 
antitrust scrutiny.2 As a consequence, a substantial number of large-scale R&D groups 
have emerged.3 Moreover, firms often participate in several of the NCRA-RJVs at the 
same time (Vonortas, 2000). Therefore, by making connections across RJVs, firms 
effectively create sizable networks. While possibly generating significant efficiencies, 
one may also wonder whether these extensive networks among competitors facilitate 
collusion in the product market (Brodley, 1990; Shapiro and Willig, 1990).4  
While the early and much cited theoretical literature on RJVs gives support to 
an industrial policy approach by showing that joint R&D often leads to welfare 
improvements, an important aspect of these studies is the assumption that cooperation 
at the R&D stage does not lead to coordination in the product market (Brander and 
                                                 
1
 See Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), Hernan, Marin and Siotis (2003), and Röller, Siebert and 
Tombak (2007) for empirical evidence.  
2
 Among other advantages, authorities would apply the rule of reason instead of a per se illegality 
presumption to firms in an RJV filed under the NCRA.  
3
 Jorde and Teece (1999, p82) argue: “A research joint venture may not do enough to overcome 
appropriability problems, unless many potential competitors are in the joint venture.” This statement 
coincides with the intended purpose of US policy makers to include as many competitors as possible in 
the NCRA collaborations.  
4
 For instance, in 1990 US antitrust authorities found six important oil companies that were also 
participating in the NCRA program guilty of sharing price information. See Coordinated Proceedings 
in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 906 F2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990) and Petroleum Products 
Antitrust Litigation, 906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990), and Helland and Goeree (2010) for a discussion of 
this case. 
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Spencer 1983; Spence 1984; Katz, 1986; Kamien, Muller and Zang, 1992).5 More 
recent contributions, however, show that when firms are allowed to cooperate in the 
product market, RJV-participation helps in sustaining collusion therein. This can 
occur through several mechanisms. First, RJVs can be facilitating vehicles which 
create common assets – and therefore common interests – among participating firms 
and therefore provide a new credible punishment device (Cabral, 2000; Martin, 
1995).6 Second, through the sharing of research findings, RJVs may reduce cost 
asymmetries among firms and hence make product market agreements more stable 
(Miyagiwa, 2009). And third, RJVs can be used for the transmission of information to 
signal cooperative behavior (Cooper and Ross, 2009). These theoretical arguments 
thus show that there are various channels through which R&D collaboration may 
facilitate product market coordination.  
This paper proposes an empirical test of whether RJVs have led to collusion, 
explicitly taking into account that firms may have different reasons for joining. In 
particular, we allow for an oligopolistic market, where firms participate in RJVs for 
either efficiency or collusive reasons. In this context, one can show that an 
empirically tractable condition exists that identifies the welfare implications of joint 
R&D activities, namely whether the market share of the participating firms (insiders) 
changes with being a member in an RJV. Specifically, it is argued that a sufficient 
condition for identifying collusive behavior is an insiders’ declining market share 
with respect to non-participating rivals. A lower insider market share is also necessary 
and sufficient for a decrease in consumer welfare.  
This test is then applied to the NCRA data by estimating an autoregressive 
market share equation with dynamic panel data techniques. We control for the 
endogeneity of research collaboration through predetermined drivers of RJV-
participation. The advantage of our approach of testing the competitive impact of 
RJVs via market shares is that one does not need data on prices, costs, and elasticities, 
which are frequently not available, not reliable, or difficult to measure. 
                                                 
5
 An early exception is d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) who consider a duopoly model of R&D 
coordination and find that welfare is often reduced if firms also collude in the product market. 
6
 This idea is reminiscent of Bernheim and Whinston’s (1990) theory of multi-market contact: firms 
that interact in more than one market may be able to sustain collusion more easily by reducing overall 
asymmetries. Spagnolo (1999) further shows that multi-market contact can facilitate coordination 
because when firms are present in more markets then the lost profits from deviation increase faster than 
the gains from deviation. 
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There are few empirical studies on the relationship between R&D cooperation 
and collusion. Our empirical methodology is closest to Gugler and Siebert’s (2007) 
study, which compares mergers to RJVs. These authors estimate an endogenous 
switching regression model and find no differences between the two modes of 
cooperation in their effect on market shares. However, they do not allow for the 
heterogeneous effects of RJV-participation while  it is unlikely that all types of R&D 
collaborations are used for product market coordination.  
Helland and Goeree (2010) investigate whether a toughening of the US 
leniency program in 1993 motivated a decline in RJV-participation under the NCRA 
program. The underlying idea is that if firms use the NCRA-RJVs as a collusive tool, 
then tougher antitrust sanctions should make firms more cautious. By finding that 
fewer firms enter, they conclude that the NCRA-program has led to collusion.7 
By contrast, our approach differs from the above work by relying on market 
shares, which in turn makes it possible to distinguish between collusion and 
efficiency, as well as to make a welfare assessment. The heterogeneous effects of 
RJV-participation are also explicitly considered. Specifically, we distinguish between 
RJVs amongst firms that are not competing in the same product market (“vertical 
RJVs”), which are more likely to be only efficiency enhancing, and RJVs that include 
direct competitors (“horizontal RJVs”), which are potential vehicles for collusion.8 As 
an aside, note that the term “vertical RJV” is used as a contrast to the horizontal 
RJVs. It is, however, not necessarily the case that these RJVs consist of firms that are 
vertically linked in product markets; there may be no relation at all. 
Furthermore, we take into account that firms frequently participate in several 
horizontal RJVs, thereby creating networks amongst direct competitors that in some 
instances include a substantial part of the industry.9 In sum, our approach incorporates 
aspects of both the size and scope of research collaborations. 
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. On average, RJV-
participation does not lead to a significant change in market shares, which suggests 
                                                 
7
 Note further that in an experimental setting Suetens (2008) finds that R&D cooperation indeed 
facilitates price collusion.  
8
 Examples of competitors involved in the same NCRA-RJVs include Texaco and Chevron in the 
petroleum industry, Apple and Dell in the computer industry, Texas Instruments and AMD in the 
semiconductor industry, and Burlington Northern Santa Fe and Union Pacific in the railroad industry.  
9
 In the petroleum industry, for instance, six direct competitors are connected through their 
participation in several NCRA-RJVs. The formed networks are even larger in other industries; sixteen 
competitors are connected in the computer industry and twenty one in the special-industry-machinery 
sector. 
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that some RJVs are used for innovation and others mainly for collusive purposes. By 
contrast, vertical RJVs lead to a significant increase in market shares, which 
corresponds to the view that non-competing firms enter RJVs to realize efficiency 
gains. RJVs amongst competitors display a decline in market share, indicating 
collusion and lower consumer surplus. This result on horizontal RJVs becomes 
statistically stronger when the network structure is also taken into account: 
sufficiently large horizontal networks lead to a significant drop in market share. These 
findings suggest that it is the nature and size of the formed network that drives the 
welfare aspects of RJV cooperation. Empirically, we estimate the horizontal network 
size above which it becomes problematic in terms of collusion when it includes 18% 
or more of its direct competitors. Overall, our results are in line with the conjecture 
that joint R&D activities can lead to collusion in the product market, in particular 
when a large number of direct competitors are involved. 
The setup of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces the formal 
framework, where our theoretical identification strategy is presented. Section 3 
describes the data and characterizes the network formation through RJV participation. 
Section 4 develops the empirical estimation strategy, and Section 5 explains the 
results. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Formal framework 
We give a formal reasoning of how collusion through R&D collaboration impacts a 
participating firm’s (net) market share and consumer welfare, taking into account that 
these cooperations may be used for innovative purposes, for collusion, or for both. 
Our setting allows for firms competing in quantities, but we later argue that the same 
identification strategy also works when firms compete in prices. For quantity 
competition, the setup of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) is closely followed, as this is one 
of the most general inter-firm collaboration models in terms of demand and supply 
specification.10 We further discuss some of the more restrictive assumptions of this 
model and argue that the results would stay qualitatively the same by relaxing these 
conditions.  
 
                                                 
10
 Although theirs is a merger model, the same argumentation can be used for firms colluding through 
RJVs, not taking into account how exactly firms use RJVs as a collusive device, which is outside the 
scope of this paper. In other words, we abstract from all internal stability issues of collusion; see e.g. 
Cabral (2000) and Cooper and Ross (2009) for self-enforcing agreements through RJV membership. 
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A basic framework: quantity competition 
We begin with an explanation of the general mechanism. Consider a market with N 
firms competing à la Cournot in homogenous goods. Demand is given by ( )p X , 
where p is price, X is industry output, and '( ) 0p X  . We denote a firm i’s cost 
function by ( )ic x , where ix  is firm i’s output, and ( )x ic x its marginal cost. The first-
order condition is then ( ) '( ) ( ) 0i x ip X x p X c x    and the Cournot equilibrium is a 
vector 1( ,..., )Nx x  such that the first-order condition holds for all N firms. When 
imposing two standard conditions on the Cournot equilibrium to ensure uniqueness, 
one can show that:11  
 
Lemma 1: When firms compete à la Cournot, then an exogenous output change by a 
group of K<N firms moves aggregate output in the same direction, but by less. 
 
This Lemma is the “workhorse” for further analysis. We now focus on RJVs and start 
with the case where firms enter an RJV only for innovation purposes. Participation 
then leads to a lower marginal cost function ( ) ( )RJV i x ic x c xd for each of the K 
participating firms (insiders).12 As a consequence, each of the K insiders increases 
output, which naturally follows from the first-order condition.13 In response, the 
remaining N-K rivals (outsiders) lower their production accordingly to re-establish the 
Cournot equilibrium. Therefore, insiders’ market share rises with respect to the 
outsiders. Of course, by Lemma 1, total production X increases as well. Therefore, 
given that 0)(' Xp , consumer welfare rises when firms participate in RJVs solely 
for innovation reasons.  
On the other hand, when firms use RJVs only for collusion, the K insiders, by 
jointly deciding upon production levels in the product market, use their enhanced 
                                                 
11
 Given that this and further proofs are straightforward extensions of Farrell and Shapiro (1990), they 
are left out for reasons of space. The first condition imposes downward sloping reaction curves, 
'( ) ''( ) 0.ip X x p X   The second condition states that each firm’s residual demand curve intersects its 
marginal cost curve from above, ( ) '( ).xx ic x p X!  
12
 The assumption that NCRA-RJVs mainly lead to cost reductions rather than to the introduction of 
new products is in accordance with their intended purposes (Link, 1996). As is also  argued in Gugler 
and Siebert (2007), many articles and case studies of RJVs confirm that the vast majority of RJVs focus 
(exclusively) on the development of new technologies resulting in cost reductions. Examples for the 
NCRA-RJVS include Link (1996) and Röller et al. (2007). Moreover, case studies by Chang and 
Podolny (2002), Silverman (2002) and Yoffie (2005) describe how RJVs focus on process innovation.  
13
 It is assumed for now that firms have ex-ante identical cost functions; the K participants therefore 
expand their production in the same way.  
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market power to lower output. The N-K outsiders respond by increasing theirs. 
Insiders’ market share thus goes down with respect to the outsiders. Further, given 
that the total production decreases (Lemma 1), prices increase and consumer welfare, 
hence, is lower.  
 Since firms potentially enter RJVs both for collusive and innovation purposes, 
the effects on insiders’ market shares, equilibrium production and equilibrium prices 
is a priori ambivalent. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a net effect. A group of K 
colluding insiders decrease their production if the following holds: the total mark-up 
of the K firms should be less than the sum of their pre-RJV mark-ups, keeping their 
production constant at the pre-RJV level.14 In other words, insiders decrease 
production if and only if ( ) ( )
K K
iRJV x ip c x p c xª º d ¬ ¼¦ ¦ , where p is the pre-RJV 
price, the cost functions xc  are measured at pre-RJV output levels ix , and RJVc  is 
measured at total pre-RJV output ¦K ix . As a consequence, K colluding RJV 
members lead, relative to the pre-RJV situation, to a decrease in output when  
(1)                                           
( ) ( )
1
K K
i ix RJVc x c x
p
K

d
¦ ¦
. 
As a consequence of firms’ first-order condition, the market shares of the K insiders 
then decline with respect to the N-K outsiders and, by Lemma 1, total output 
decreases. Therefore, when inequality (1) is satisfied, K firms participate in RJVs and 
collusive effects dominate innovation, resulting in declining market shares.  
 
Thus, we can state the theoretical identification condition for collusion. 
 
Identification: A necessary condition for firms to collude through RJV participation is 
a decrease in market share with respect to their non-participating rivals. When this 
occurs, the product market price rises, leading to a decrease in consumer welfare.  
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 This is a reinterpretation of Proposition 1 of Farrell and Shapiro (1990, p. 112) for RJVs, extending 
their reasoning from 2 to K firms. 
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Extensions of the basic framework 
The qualitative implications of our framework remain the same when relaxing its 
assumptions. First, the model assumes homogenous goods. As products become more 
differentiated, firms impose fewer negative externalities on each other and 
consequently reduce their output by less when colluding through RJV-participation. 
Insiders then gain less by colluding and as a consequence seek a lower increase in 
price. Therefore, a lower degree of innovation is needed to offset collusive effects, as 
Gugler and Siebert (2007) also show in a merger model with linear demand. Thus, 
while having an influence on exactly how much innovation neutralizes collusion, the 
predictions on market shares are robust to any degree of product differentiation.  
 Second, although our setup assumes for simplicity that firms exhibit ex-ante 
symmetric cost-functions, the above condition –while potentially not holding for each 
of the RJV-participating firms– still holds on average for the K insiders when these 
firms have ex-ante asymmetric cost functions, as long as this distribution of cost 
functions is not too dispersed. It is this average effect that is needed for our empirical 
application.  
Further, we do not model firms’ choice of R&D-levels when entering an RJV 
for innovation. That is, it is assumed that it is always profitable for firms in “only-
innovation-RJVs” to invest in a lower marginal cost. If firms are profit-maximizers, 
this assumption is logically satisfied. Indeed, then firms only enter an innovation-RJV 
when this is profitable and, absent collusive effects, these RJVs should thus lead to a 
lower marginal cost. In any case, this assumption will be empirically confirmed: firms 
that enter in vertical RJVs – i.e. RJVs that are set up amongst non-competitors and are 
thus hardly intended for collusive purposes – exhibit (i) an increase in R&D spending 
and (ii) a higher resulting market share, which is consistent with these firms having 
invested in R&D to reach a lower marginal cost of production.15  
                                                 
15
 Note that these empirical observations are also consistent with a more complex model where both 
RJV insiders and outsiders have the possibility to invest in R&D. When R&D is characterized by 
strategic complementarities, then the average R&D spending for insiders should be higher than for 
outsiders, leading to a relatively lower marginal cost for participants, as Banal-Estañol, Macho-Stadler 
and Seldeslachts (2008) show in a merger context. The same work also considers an endogenous 
merger-model where R&D-spending is a strategic variable, which is equivalent to firms entering in 
RJVs for collusive purposes and deciding whether to innovate as well. When R&D is hard to organize 
among participating firms or too costly relative to its benefits, then firms cooperate in the product 
market but won’t innovate, which leads to a loss in market share. If, on the other hand, participating 
firms both cooperate in the product market and innovate, then their market shares increase vis-à-vis 
outsiders. These results, therefore, indicate that a more elaborated RJV setup than ours would yield the 
same empirical identification. 
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We briefly explain the reasoning when firms compete in prices and products 
are differentiated.16 Assume again that the strategic variable –price in this setting– 
moves more by the initial decision of a group of K firms than by the reaction of their 
N-K rivals, which is again a necessary condition to reach a unique equilibrium (see for 
example Vives, 1985, for an extensive discussion). When firms enter an RJV purely 
for innovation reasons, marginal costs decrease. As a result, the insiders set lower 
prices. Rivals react by setting lower prices as well, given that price-setting exhibits 
strategic complementarities (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984). However, given that the 
reaction by outsiders is not as strong as the initial price decrease, insiders capture a 
larger part of the market. Therefore, they gain market share and consumer welfare 
increases. If, on the other hand, firms participate purely for collusive reasons, insiders 
raise prices (or, equivalently, contract output). Rivals react by increasing prices as 
well, but by less; thus contracting output by less. Therefore, insiders lose market share 
with respect to their rivals and, at the same time, consumer welfare decreases due to 
higher product market prices. If, finally, RJV-participation induces firms to both 
reduce costs and to collude, when collusion dominates cost reduction it must logically 
be that (i) insiders lose market share and (ii) consumer welfare decreases. Our 
identification, therefore, is the same as when firms compete in quantities.  
Note that the above analysis on market shares of insiders vis-à-vis their non-
participating rivals assumes partial collusion, i.e. restrictive agreements are formed 
among competitors that involve a subset of the industry. Although most theoretical 
works on cartels assume the monopolization of the industry, partial cartels have often 
occurred in reality. For example, three North-American and five European firms in 
the citric acid industry were fined for fixing prices and allocating sales in the 
worldwide market. Their joint market share was around 60 percent (Levenstein and 
Suslow, 2006). Also, a cartel among shipping firms in the North Atlantic constituted 
75% of the market (Escrihuela-Villar, 2003). Recently, a small but growing 
theoretical literature has also started to examine partial cartels. Bos and Harrington 
(2010), for example, consider the endogenous formation of cartels and find that the 
optimal cartel size in an industry is less than all-inclusive when colluding is costly or 
firms are sufficiently patient, and colluding firms are relatively large with respect to 
their non-colluding rivals. Escrihuela-Villar (2008) determines that a partial cartel is 
                                                 
16
 Price competition in homogenous goods yields non-continuities and it is often hard to interpret 
results; see Vives (1999) for a discussion.  
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internally and externally stable because allowing more members would increase the 
incentives for each to deviate and undercut the collusive price. In sum, both empirical 
evidence and theory confirm that partial collusion is profitable.  
 
3. Data 
Our data is based on three sources: the NCRA-RJV database, which holds information 
on RJVs and its participants under the National Cooperative Research Act (1985-
1999), the Compustat North America database containing firm-specific information 
on about 22,000 publicly traded US firms (1986-1999), and the NBER US Patent 
Citations Data File. The starting point is all 785 NCRA-RJVs registered in the period 
1985-1999 involving 5,755 for-profit entities. There are also non-profit entities in 
some NCRA-RJVS, but since these are not relevant for the purpose of this paper, they 
will not be considered.  
We provide a short overview of the NCRA-RJV data – for a detailed 
explanation see Link (1996) and Vonortas (1997).17 The enactment of the NCRA in 
1984 and its amended version, the National Cooperative Research and Production Act 
(NCRPA), have been created to stimulate R&D in the US. In particular, the act allows 
American firms to establish large RJVs that conduct pre-competitive R&D and has 
been implemented by the US Congress as part of an industrial policy to improve 
international competitiveness of American companies and industries.18 Under the 
terms of the NCRA, a notice must be filed with both the US Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing the RJV’s principal research content 
and its initial members; subsequent notifications of changes in membership or 
research intent are also required. In return, certain antitrust exemptions are granted to 
the NCRA-RJVs, such as, for example, the application of the rule of reason instead of 
the per se rule and the exemption from treble damages when illegal behavior is found.  
 In order to obtain firm- and industry-level measures, we match 1,013 out of 
the original 5,755 NCRA for-profit entities to firms in the COMPUSTAT North 
America database. The dropped firms are mostly small and, in a few cases, non-US 
                                                 
17
 We thank Nicolas Vonortas from George Washington University for making this data available to us. 
18
 Accordingly, an RJV may be filed under the NCRA when its purposes are “(a) theoretical analysis, 
experimentation, or systematic study of phenomena or observable facts, (b) the development or testing 
of basic engineering techniques, (c) the extension of investigative finding or theory of a scientific or 
technical nature into practical application for experimental and demonstration purposes..., (d) the 
collection, exchange, and analysis of research information, or (e) any combination of the [above].” 
(Link, 1996) 
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firms. The remaining companies constitute our sample of RJV participants. We then 
tie 630 out of the 1,013 entities to the NBER US Patent Citations Data File, 
containing all filed US patents since 1963. This means that the other 383 RJV insiders 
do not hold any patent. As explained in the next section in more detail, the reason for 
matching RJV insiders with the patent database is because patents are an important 
tool in our strategy to instrument for research collaboration.  
The sample of outsiders in an industry in a given year is generated by taking 
all those firms which did not participate in any RJV in that industry and the given 
year, where an “industry” is defined according to firms’ primary SIC4 codes. We 
exclude the firms that compete in industries with no RJV from our sample of 
outsiders, since these firms do not face any insiders.19 Out of these 9,597 unique 
outsiders, we match 1,355 to patent data. The other outsiders are assigned zero 
patents.  
In sum, we generate a sufficiently large sample of both NCRA-COMPUSTAT 
insiders and non-NCRA COMPUSTAT outsiders with information about their patent 
activities. Unfortunately, COMPUSTAT does not provide complete series on the 
included variables; we therefore drop all those firms-observations for which we have 
missing values on sales, as this variable is needed to define a firm’s market share. 
Finally, those industries where the number of firms is lower than 3 are dropped as 
these are considered to be outliers. The final sample, i.e. the included firms over the 
period 1986-1999, is an unbalanced panel with on average 430 insider-year 
observations (ranging from 130 in 1986 to 732 in 1999) and 5,435 outsider-year 
observations (ranging from 4,102 in 1986 to 6,765 in 1999). 
The variables “market share” and “research collaboration” are two important 
variables in our analysis below, and are thus first discussed. Market shares are 
constructed by using firms’ sales as reported in their primary 4-digit standard industry 
classification (SIC4), which is equivalent to the currently used 6-digit NAICS level.20 
This aggregation level represents the most detailed industry classification possible on 
the basis of SIC codes. The definition of the relevant product market is always an 
issue in antitrust. Although we use 4-digit SIC classifications, it is possible that the 
                                                 
19
 To be precise, the firms in these industries are not included in the main analysis, but are used in a test 
of the exclusion restrictions for our instruments. 
20
 The market share of a firm is defined as the firm’s yearly sales divided by the sum of yearly sales in 
its primary SIC4 industry (see Table 1 for the precise definition).  
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relevant antitrust market is smaller.21 If so, effects would be underestimated, as they 
are likely to be larger in smaller markets. In this case our estimates are a lower bound. 
Our first measure of RJV participation is based purely on whether a firm is 
participating in at least one RJV (“RJV any”). Since it is more likely that collusive 
effects are present when firms are competitors, we then define a variable “RJV 
horizontal”, which is relevant when a firm meets at least one competitor in this RJV, 
where competitors are defined as firms competing in the same SIC4 industry. We also 
define a variable “RJV vertical” when no members in the RJV are competitors.  
Table 2a provides summary statistics in which some first patterns can be 
observed. Firms that do not enter RJVs are smaller in terms of market shares, total 
assets, R&D expenditures and patent stock. 22 In particular, the difference between 
insiders and outsiders for the latter two innovation-variables is substantial, suggesting 
that these might be factors related to participation decisions. If we partition the RJV 
insiders in those that participate in either vertical or horizontal RJVs, we observe that 
the members in horizontal RJVs are larger in terms of total assets, R&D expenditures 
and patent stock, yet they are smaller in terms of market shares. 
 
   [Insert Table 2a about here] 
 
To further identify the collusive nature of RJV cooperations, more precise 
measures for horizontal RJVs are then defined. One possibility would be to look at the 
number of direct competitors in an RJV (see Helland and Goeree, 2010). Yet, about 
one-third of all insiders collaborate in several NCRA-RJVs – the mean being 4.02 
RJVs per participating firm – thereby effectively creating networks. For example, in 
the petroleum industry Chevron, Amoco, Exxon and Texaco all participate in more 
than 70 NCRA-RJVs; in the semiconductor industry Intel and Texas Instruments are 
members in 20 and 18 RJVs, respectively; and in the computer industry IBM, Hewlett 
Packard and Apple have joined more than 20 research collaborations.  
This network dimension might be especially relevant when investigating 
collusive effects, as product market coordination often works through competitors 
                                                 
21
 The median number of firms in a given SIC4 industry is 34. It is difficult to say in general how many 
firms operate in an antitrust market. As an example, in a study containing 150 European horizontal 
merger cases, Duso et al. (2007) find that the European Commission identified about 8 rivals to the 2 
merging firms, which thus indicates that on average an antitrust market consists of 10 firms in Europe. 
22
 To build the patent stock of firm i at time t we use a constant knowledge depreciation rate of 0.15 
(see e.g. Hall, 1990, and Griliches and Mairesse, 1984).  
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creating several formal meeting points. A sufficiently large horizontal network may 
then give insiders the critical mass to make collusion sustainable. Indeed, as Bos and 
Harrington (2010) and Escrihuela-Villar (2008) indicate, although partial collusive 
networks are stable, they need to be large enough to be profitable.23 Further, the 
punishment potential may be higher when forming a network through participation in 
several RJVs, as the multi-project argument of Vonortas (2000) indicates, and 
collusion may thus be easier to sustain.  
The size of the network may also matter for innovation. If firms participate in 
RJVs to increase their efficiency then a bigger research network might lead to a 
higher cost-reduction, for example, through a larger pool of knowledge (Veugelers, 
1998) or by benefiting more from learning effects (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). On 
the other hand, a larger network may lead to higher agency costs and more severe 
free-riding (Duso, Pennings and Seldeslachts, 2010). If this is the case, then one could 
erroneously link a loss in market share to collusion. In order to exclude this 
possibility, we will test whether firms in larger vertical networks – i.e. research 
networks among non-competitors – enjoy a larger market share gain. This will turn 
out to be the case, which means that firms in larger innovation networks enjoy higher 
efficiency gains.  
In sum, the above discussion suggests that by taking the size of the horizontal 
network into account a more precise identification of our question whether firms use 
RJVs for collusive or for innovation purposes is obtained. 
We construct a horizontal network measure as the number of unique 
competitors a firm meets in all the RJVs in which it is a member, and divide this 
figure by the total number of competitors in the industry, which gives us a measure of 
the “market coverage” of a firm through its RJV-participation. Therefore, the relative 
size of firm i’s horizontal network in an industry m in year t is defined as  
(2)  ¦
z ij ijtmtimt
contact
N
NetHorizontal
1
1
 , 
where mtN  is the number of firms present in year t in market m and  
1 if in year  firm  meets competitor  in at least one RJV
0 otherwiseijt
t i j
contact
­ ®¯ . 
                                                 
23
 Equivalently, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) show in a merger-context that a merger without 
efficiency gains, which is equivalent to our setup where firms collude and do not innovate, are only 
profitable when the merger consists of a sufficiently large number of firms present in the industry. 
 13
Since the maximum number of contacts a firm i can have with its competitors j in the 
market is the total number of firms in the industry minus one, i.e. 1mtN , we must 
necessarily have that ]1,0[  imtNetHorizontal .24 
As discussed above, the links with competitors through membership in a 
single RJV are likely to be less numerous than when taking into account a firm’s 
participation in several RJVs. To illustrate this point, we compare our network 
measure, as specified in equation (2), with two RJV-specific measures of a firm’s 
connectivity. First, the average number of competitors a firm meets in horizontal 
RJVs is calculated relative to the total number of competitors in the industry 
(“average horizontal RJV”). Second, the maximum of a firm’s links of all horizontal 
RJVs in which it is an insider is obtained, again relative to the number of firms in its 
sector (“largest horizontal RJV”).  
On average, our horizontal network variable equals 0.148, which implies that 
the average firm that participates in horizontal RJVs creates a network with its 
competitors that covers 14.8% of the industry. On the other hand, the average 
coverage per horizontal RJV is 0.082, while the relative number of links in a firm’s 
largest horizontal RJV has as mean 0.098. When testing the difference between the 
means of the two RJV-related measures and of our horizontal network variable, the 
latter is found to be significantly larger at the 1% significance level. 
To further demonstrate this issue, we look at the petroleum industry 
(SIC4=2911), where firms were effectively convicted for collusion. In 1999, for 
example, Chevron meets 9 of its 31 competitors through participation in several RJVs 
(the horizontal network size is therefore 0.29), while it links only with a maximum of 
5 in a single RJV, which implies an industry coverage of just 0.166. Exactly the same 
pattern can be observed for Texaco and Exxon. Another example is the semiconductor 
industry (SIC4=3674) in 1997, where Texas instruments meets 22 out of 127 firms in 
several horizontal RJVs, thereby creating a horizontal network of 0.173, whereas it 
only meets 11 of these competitors in one RJV, implying a coverage of 0.086. 
Virtually the same differences can be noted for other important firms in the 
semiconductor industry, as for instance Intel and AMD. These findings emphasize 
                                                 
24
 The reason we construct this variable as a relative measure, apart from the obvious scaling issues, is 
that our identification is a function of the size of the network relative to the industry (see equation 1, 
where p and ix
 both depend on N). 
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that it is potentially important to account for the fact that a firm participates in several 
RJVs. By defining a horizontal network measure, one obtains an unbiased measure of 
a firm’s effective connectivity with competitors, which we see as one of the main 
contributions of our approach. 
Figure 1 shows that the distribution of horizontal networks is considerably 
skewed to the left, i.e. most networks are relatively small and cover, on average, 
14.8% of the industry (see also the horizontal network variable in Table 2a). Based on 
this empirical distribution, we divide the networks into three size categories and 
define small networks as those that are in the lowest 25% percentile, medium-size are 
those that are in the 25%-75% range, while large networks are situated in the top 
75%.25  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Taking a first look at these data, some regularities emerge. Firms participating 
in small horizontal networks are smaller and less innovative –in terms of R&D 
expenditures and patent stock– than firms participating in medium-size networks, 
which in turn are smaller and less innovative than companies in large networks. This 
suggests a positive correlation between innovation variables, market shares, and size 
of the created horizontal network. However, in order to identify a true causal 
relationship, we revert to our econometric framework.  
 
[Insert Table 2b about here] 
 
4. Empirical implementation 
The empirical challenge is to identify consumer welfare-enhancing participation for 
innovation reasons (which leads to output expansion vis-à-vis the rivals) and 
consumer welfare-decreasing participation for collusive reasons (which leads to 
output contraction with respect to the rivals).  
Our test is implemented by estimating an autoregressive market share equation 
as a function of RJV participation, controlling for other factors that may potentially 
influence a firm’s market share. Specifically, the following equation is estimated: 
                                                 
25
 These categories are arguably arbitrary. However, different size categories (as for instance based on 
the 33rd and 67th percentiles) do not qualitatively change our results. 
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where imtMS , our dependent variable, is the market share of firm i operating in 
industry m in year t. As independent variables, we include the lagged dependent 
variable 1imtMS  , several lags of RJV participation, imtRJV W , lags of the firm’s R&D 
expenditures in logs, ( & )imtLog R D W , and 1mtX  , a vector of lagged industry-level 
control variables.26 Finally, Kim is a firm-specific fixed effect, Kt is a time fixed effect, 
and Himt is an i.i.d. normally distributed error term.  
Our control variables are defined in Table 1. Since market shares are persistent 
over time (Mueller, 1985; Gugler and Siebert, 2007), the market share equation is 
specified as an autoregressive process. By adding the lagged terms of a firm’s market 
share, the RJV participation variable effectively captures deviations from a firm’s 
market share trend.  
To account for differences across firms’ innovativeness and their impact on 
market shares, we incorporate R&D expenses at the firm level; see Hall, Mairesse and 
Mohnen (2010) for an overview of the returns of R&D. This idea goes back to 
Leonard’s (1971) seminal study, which finds a positive correlation between R&D 
spending and sales growth. Several lags of firm-level R&D spending are included, 
given that its effect typically takes time to materialize (Mansfield, 1965; Pakes and 
Schankerman, 1984).  
Finally, industry-specific factors are added.27 In particular, given that we want 
to control for the differential impact of a firm’s R&D spending relative to the industry 
in which it operates, we control for the lagged industry’s average R&D expenditures 
(variable Log(R&D)_Industry). We further include a lagged term of the average 
                                                 
26
 The parameter W stands for the precise lag. In our main specification, we chose to include up to two 
lags of RJV participation, i.e. a contemporaneous effect ( 0 W ), plus two previous years (W =1 and W =2). This choice is dictated by the need to balance two effects: to account for sufficient time such 
that RJV participation can affect the market outcome and to drop as few time periods, and hence 
observations, as possible. For consistency, we use the same number of lags for our other firm-level 
variable, i.e. R&D expenditures. The inclusion of further lags for both variables does not significantly 
affect our results. 
27
 We use one lag in this case to account for possible feedback effects and to reduce potential 
endogeneity issues. Given that these are industry control variables, the more complex and longer lag 
structure used for our main variables of interest is not replicated. 
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firm’s market value (in logs) of the SIC4 industry in which the firms operates 
(Log(MarketValue)_Industry), which serves as well as time-varying industry fixed 
effect. 28 
There is the possibility that time-specific factors may influence a firm’s 
market share. The equation therefore contains a full set of yearly time dummies which 
take into account time-specific factors that are exogenous and common to all 
industries. Finally, due to possible firm-specific time-invariant factors, we include 
firm fixed effects.  
The estimation proceeds as follows. We begin by looking at research 
collaboration as the dummy “RJV any”, which takes on the value of one whenever a 
firm is involved in at least one RJV, and the value of zero otherwise. We further 
distinguish between RJVs where firms do not meet direct competitors (vertical RJV) 
and those where they do (horizontal RJV); both are again defined as dummy 
variables. The focus then shifts to horizontal RJVs, explicitly taking the network 
structure into account, and dummies are constructed for our different size categories. 
This allows us to analyze heterogeneous effects of RJV participation and, hence, to 
make a more precise inference on the collusive potential of RJVs. 
 
Econometric issues and identification 
There are several econometric issues that need to be addressed. Since the unobserved 
panel-level effects are by construction correlated with the lagged dependent variables, 
the endogenous nature of lagged market shares must be accounted for to obtain a 
consistent estimator. The system GMM estimators developed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) are therefore used. These estimators, which 
have been widely adopted in the literature, use lags of levels and differences of the 
dependent and potentially endogenous or predetermined variables as instruments.29 
To correct for the downward bias of the system GMM two-step estimation of standard 
errors in a finite sample, we use the Windmeijer (2005) robust estimator. 
                                                 
28
 We experimented with different measures of size (total assets, sales, employees); results stay robust. 
29
 While Arellano and Bond (1991) propose using moment equations coming from the conditions that 
lagged-levels of the dependent variable and the predetermined variables are uncorrelated with first-
differences of the disturbances, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) propose 
employing the additional moment conditions that lagged differences of the dependent variable are 
orthogonal to levels of the disturbances. To use these additional moment conditions, one needs to 
assume that panel-level effects are unrelated to the first observable first-difference of the dependent 
variable. 
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Moreover, there might be problems of endogeneity due to transitory shocks. 
The potentially biggest one is the fact that a temporary and unobserved firm-specific 
shock could simultaneously influence a firm’s RJV participation and its market share. 
For example, it may be that RJV insiders are more successful in innovation and thus 
have a relatively larger market share. We use several strategies to mitigate this 
problem. First, we include several controls for this possible shock – time dummies, 
industry’s average R&D and market value, firm fixed effects and, most importantly, 
firm-level R&D. 30  
Second, our system GMM estimator allows us to use an instrumental variable 
approach using both “internal” and “external” instruments. The internal instruments 
are essentially lags and lagged differences of the dependent variable, and our RJV 
participation and R&D measures. In terms of external instruments, the lagged firm’s 
size (measured by total assets) is used, given Irwin and Klenow’s (1996) findings that 
larger firms gain more from research cooperation and from R&D knowledge 
spillovers therein. More importantly, like Gugler and Siebert (2007), we include the 
lagged number of accumulated patents. A firm’s lagged stock of patents is a measure 
of how efficiently it innovates and is thus a likely significant determinant of RJV 
participation, if firms (partly) join for innovation reasons. Indeed, as Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) show, firms better capture R&D spillovers from other participants 
when their innovative capacity is greater. The first two columns of the preliminary 
statistics in Table 2a show that firms participating in RJVs own a much higher patent 
stock (3.8 versus 150.9 discounted accumulated patents, respectively). Furthermore, 
firms in horizontal RJVs have more patents than insiders in vertical RJVs (167.9 
versus 124.7 accumulated patents).  
The lagged patent stock is a good instrument for RJV membership when it is 
correlated with RJV participation, controlling for the other factors that are used in the 
framework. Therefore, the research participation measures are regressed on the patent 
stock of firms, including the predetermined factors of our main regression.31 Table 3 
                                                 
30
 A firm’s R&D may be suffering from similar problems. We correct for its potential endogeneity 
through the use of internal instruments available through the system GMM estimator. 
31
 All the explanatory variables are lagged three periods to be sure that we do not infer correlations due 
to reverse causality and to mimic the instruments used in the main regression where lags 3 to 6 are 
employed as instruments. Results are qualitatively identical when using different lag structures. 
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shows that a firm’s patent stock, indeed, significantly influences all types of RJV 
participation; the same holds for a firm’s size, our other external instrument.32  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Furthermore, for patent stock to be a valid instrument, it must also be 
uncorrelated with the error term in equation (3). Thus, the exclusion restrictions are 
tested by estimating the firm’s market share equation (3) as a function of its patent 
stock in all those industries where no RJVs are formed during the sample period –and 
thus also naturally excluding the RJV participation variable. If a firm’s patent stock 
has no direct influence on its market share, then it must be the case that its impact in 
these industries is insignificant. As Table 4 shows for different lags of the patent 
stock, this turns out to be the case. Therefore, we are confident that lagged patent 
stocks are a good external instrument for research collaborations. 33  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The final step of our empirical identification strategy is based on the role of 
heterogeneous effects. The theoretical setup predicts differential responses across 
distinct categories of RJV participation. If RJVs are (partly) used for collusive 
purposes, then our model predicts a positive impact on a firm’s market share when 
                                                 
32
 Given that the GMM methodology is used, one can easily include more variables as instruments. 
Other candidates to account for a firm’s participation are innovation measures, such as firm-level R&D 
expenditures. Table 2 grossly shows the same pattern for yearly R&D expenditures as was found for a 
firm’s patent stock. Table 3 confirms that lagged firm-level R&D expenditures significantly influence 
the different dimensions of research collaboration. We therefore also employ lagged R&D expenditures 
in the instrument matrix. Note that, given that we incorporate a measure for a firm’s size, the 
instrument matrix includes R&D expenditures and not R&D intensity (which yields insignificant 
coefficients when replacing expenditures in the estimations in Table 3). 
33
 We explain here in detail our instrumenting strategy. The internal instruments for the differenced 
equation are lags 3 to 6 of the market share, RJV-participation measures, and the log of R&D expenses, 
while the external instruments are the three-year lagged patent stock, total assets, the one-year lagged 
industry average of the log of market value and R&D expenses, and the set of year dummies. The 
internal GMM-type instruments for the level equation are the three-year lagged market share and the 
log of R&D expenditures. In some specifications we slightly departed from this general structure if the 
Hansen-Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions rejected our original structure. In these instances we 
reduced the number of used lags. In general, we employed a parsimonious lag structure to avoid the 
well-known problem of model-overfit due to including too many instruments, which can lead to the 
failure of cleaning up the endogenous components of the problematic regressors (Windmeijer, 2005). 
As a rule of thumb, it is often suggested to keep the number of the instruments lower than the number 
of panels, which is always and abundantly the case in our estimation. We also experimented with 
different lag structures and results are qualitatively robust.  
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participating in vertical RJVs but a negative impact when entering a horizontal RJV. 
Further, if the size of the horizontal network matters for collusion, then different size 
categories might yield distinctive effects on a firm’s market share. Since our empirical 
results generate different reactions for dissimilar types of RJV participation, this is 
further evidence that endogeneity has been addressed. Indeed, it is hard to come up 
with a story for why an omitted shock should yield other results for different 
categories. Although one can never fully rule out the possibility that some complex 
interaction of omitted shocks would drive the results, this seems unlikely.  
 
5. Results 
 
Specification tests and control variables 
First, some specification tests are performed. For convergence, the point estimate of 
the lagged dependent variable needs to be less than 1. This test is performed for all 
specifications. We can never reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is less than 
1 (at the 1% or 5% significance level).  
Two standard specification tests are applied on the system GMM estimator. 
First, since the number of instruments is much larger than the potentially endogenous 
variables, the Hansen-Sargan J statistic for over-identifying restrictions can be used to 
test for the joint exogeneity of the moment conditions. Second, to define the moment 
conditions, the system GMM hinges on having no serial correlation in the error terms. 
Given that our fixed effect estimator is based on first differences, one can check this 
assumption by testing the absence of second-order serial correlation in the disturbance 
term (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In all specifications, the Hansen-Sargan and the 
Arellano-Bond tests show that the estimation performs well: we cannot reject the joint 
hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid (i.e. our instruments are 
exogenous) and we reject the presence of autocorrelation. 
The parameter estimates for the control variables are intuitive. Most 
importantly, R&D exerts a negative effect on MS, although this effect is weak.34 
Given that the focus of this paper is on the collusive intent underlying research 
                                                 
34
 In the RJV any-specification (column 1 of Table 5), the cumulative R&D effect is -0.0039 (p-value 
0.11). In the RJV vertical vs. RJV horizontal specification (column 2) the cumulative R&D effect is -
0.0008 (p-value 0.56). In the last specification, where we compare RJV vertical to the small-medium-
large horizontal networks (column 3), the cumulative R&D effect is -0.0002 (p-value 0.16).  
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cooperation, the parameter estimates for the controls in further specifications and 
samples are not discussed, since their impact is similar across all regressions. 
 
RJV participation – horizontal vs. vertical RJVs  
We begin by testing whether any type of RJV participation yields a significant change 
in market shares. Given that we allow for the effect to work through several periods, 
for this and subsequent regressions only the cumulative effect of three subsequent 
years is reported. As can be seen in Table 5, the impact is negligible. A positive effect 
of less than 0.2 percentage points is found, and this gain in market share is not 
significant. This result is in line with Gugler and Siebert (2007), who discover a 
cumulative increase in market share of 0.52 percentage points in the US 
semiconductor industry. Given the likely heterogeneity in the incentives to participate 
in an RJV, this average result is not surprising. If some RJVs take place for innovative 
reasons, while others are started for collusive purposes, then the net effect may simply 
be inconsiderable across all cases.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 We therefore explore the characteristics of RJVs and check whether they are 
systematically related to collusion. Specifically, vertical and horizontal RJVs are 
separated. The second column of Table 5 reports the impact of vertical RJVs; 
membership therein increases a firm’s market share with 3.4 percentage points, which 
is significant at the 5% level. That implies that RJVs among non-competitors yield 
significant efficiency gains and that collusion plays no role. This finding is in 
accordance with the fact that non-horizontal relationships typically have positive 
welfare effects. It is also consistent with our framework where RJVs that are set up 
purely for innovation should increase insiders’ market share. The result therefore 
confirms our formal set-up. In addition, the higher market share appears to be linked 
to an increased level of R&D expenditures, indicating that research exhibits strategic 
complementarities, as explained in footnote 17.35  
                                                 
35
 In an OLS regression, which is not reported because of space constraints, we estimate the log of 
R&D expenses as a function of lagged participation in vertical RJVs, correcting for the other 
exogenous factors used in the main regression and using a full set of time dummies and firm fixed 
effects. The coefficient estimate of vertical RJV membership is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. 
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As we are interested in collusion, we zoom further in on horizontal RJVs. We 
begin by estimating the average effect of horizontal RJVs using the dummy variable 
approach. As can be seen in the second column of Table 5, a small cumulative market 
share loss of -0.17 percentage points is detected, but the effect is statistically 
insignificant. This implies that for the average horizontal RJV, efficiencies and 
collusionary effects on market shares are statistically balanced. In terms of our 
framework, it also suggests that consumers do not benefit on average from horizontal 
RJVs. While this result is interesting in its own right, we further proceed by 
investigating the characteristics of horizontal RJVs. 
 
RJV participation –network effects 
We examine whether the total number of direct links with competitors plays any role. 
Using the dummy variables defined in Section 3, we test whether the size of the 
formed network is systematically related to collusion. Column 3 of Table 5 shows that 
small horizontal networks yield a small positive effect on market shares of 0.43 
percentage points (although not significant), medium-size networks decrease the 
market share by -0.93 percentage points (significant at the 10% level), while firms in 
large networks show a -2.8 percentage point change (significant at the 5% level). 
These coefficients indicate that the larger the network, the bigger and the more 
significant the effect on market shares is. This shows that product market coordination 
is statistically related to large horizontal networks, while there is no evidence that 
small networks are prone to collusion.   
To exclude the possibility that larger networks lead to a decrease in market 
share due to increased agency problems or higher coordination costs, we investigate 
the impact of size in vertical networks. Under the plausible assumption that these 
issues are similar in both vertical and horizontal RJVs, a positive effect of size on 
market shares in collaborations among non-competitors is inconsistent with efficiency 
losses in larger networks. As is shown in Table 6, medium-size and large vertical 
networks lead to a significant increase in market share of their participating firms.36 
                                                 
36
 Note that our vertical network is constructed in a slightly different way to our horizontal network. 
Given that one cannot easily come up with a relative measure for non-competitors, we just sum the 
unique contacts of a given firm in its vertical RJVs. We then look at the distribution of this count and 
divide vertical RJVs in small (the first quartile of the distribution), medium (the second and third 
quartile), and large (the top quartile). 
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This strongly suggests that the negative market shares in larger horizontal networks 
cannot be attributed to efficiency losses.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
In sum, the results confirm that large horizontal networks are prone to collusion in the 
product market. This contrasts with the results for vertical RJVs, which lead to 
innovative gains that are increasing with the size of the created network.  
Besides having policy relevance, these findings also lend further support to 
our identification strategy, as it is hard to explain through an omitted shock how 
different types of RJVs and size classes of the formed networks would yield a 
differential outcome on a firm’s market share.  
 
Critical network size 
In order to estimate a critical network size above which collusion can be identified, a 
continuous model is proposed. In particular, the following market share equation is 
estimated: 
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where all variables are as in equation (3), except that we define a new continuous 
horizontal network variable RN and further include its quadratic term 2RN . This 
quadratic specification can be associated with a specific parameterization of our 
general theoretical framework where demand is linear, competition is in quantities 
and firms face increasing marginal costs and/or differentiated products.37 
 Figure 2 plots the estimated continuous effect for the network variable from 
equation (4) and compares it to the discrete heterogeneous effect reported in column 3 
of Table 5. The continuous specification traces out the categorical specification, i.e. 
                                                 
37
 This parameterization is equivalent to the classical merger paper by Perry and Porter (1985), which 
can be adapted to an RJV model where participation may lead to efficiency gains and/or product 
market collusion. See Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2006) for a full derivation of this framework. As a 
robustness check, we estimated the model with a polynomial of third degree. The results from this 
estimation are qualitatively identical to those obtained with our quadratic form in terms of point 
estimates. However, we lose precision, which points to possible specification problems with the cubic 
functional form and to the chosen quadratic form better fitting the data.  
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participating in small networks has a positive near-zero impact on market shares, 
while membership in larger networks yields a significantly negative effect. In 
particular, the plot follows a U-shaped pattern, which reaches a minimum at a 
network size of 0.69, where firms on average lose a market share of -3.8%.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Most importantly for our purposes, a critical network size K* can be identified 
above which the market share of insiders is lower than that of outsiders. Specifically, 
we estimate this critical point to lie at K*=0.18 (10% significance level). In other 
words, participation in horizontal RJVs, thereby leading to a network with direct 
competitors that consist of more than 18% of the firms in that market, is likely to lead 
to collusion. 38 
Empirically, we find that 29% of the observations that have a strictly positive 
value for the horizontal network variable fall above that critical threshold. This 
corresponds to 198 out of 678 unique firms which at any time participated in 
horizontal RJVs.  
One can make use of the estimated critical value to indicate some industries in 
which firms’ RJV membership leads to horizontal networks above the threshold. 
Suspect combinations come, for example, from small networks (of three firms) in a 
small industry of nine firms, resulting in a relative network size of 0.33 (“Soap, 
Detergents, Perfumes and Cosmetics”, SIC=2840). At the other end of the spectrum, 
the “Special Industry Machinery” (SIC=3559) has the most links in absolute terms 
counting 21 firms (covering 0.38 of the industry). In relative terms, the largest 
network is situated in the Electronic Computers industry (SIC=3571), where 47% of 
the competitors are connected via RJVs (16 out of 34 firms in the industry). Table 7 
shows these and more industries that are suspect under our framework. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
                                                 
38
 Given the low frequency of high values for the horizontal network variable (see also Figure 1), we 
lose some precision in the network coefficients' estimates when we are approaching the end of the 
distribution. Less than 2 % of the values for the network variable lay above the threshold of 0.7, which 
makes confidence intervals widen substantially. These observations can be traced back to 7 firms that 
all belong to the cement and hydraulic industry (SIC4=3241). 
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An alternative measure for horizontal networks is further constructed, which 
counts not only a firm’s direct but also its indirect links. This accounts for the 
possibility that firms can potentially collaborate in collusion via indirect contacts, for 
instance through a “central player” that communicates with “fringe players” to 
coordinate on collusion, even when these fringe players are not directly connected. It 
is shown in the Appendix that this network variable yields virtually the same results 
on firms’ market shares. 
 
6. Conclusion and Implications 
Given the pressing need for economies to innovate, governments often encourage 
firms to cooperate in R&D since collaborations may help firms to obtain research 
objectives more efficiently. However, joint activities that create networks among 
competitors may also facilitate collusion in the product market, which is socially 
undesirable.  
This paper investigates whether RJVs lead to coordination in the product 
market. In particular, we derive an empirically tractable identification condition that 
allows us to test whether collusion has taken place. A decline in market shares of 
firms participating in RJVs is a necessary condition for collusion and, at the same 
time, is necessary and sufficient for consumer surplus to decrease. This approach is 
applied to data on R&D collaborations created under the National Cooperation 
Research Act (NCRA), which was established to stimulate joint research by granting 
antitrust exemptions.   
The main findings are summarized as follows. No average effect of RJVs on 
market shares is found. As a result, one cannot identify product market collusion for 
all RJVs. By contrast, RJVs where direct competitors meet (horizontal RJVs) are 
more suspect than RJVs between non-competitors (vertical RJVs). Moreover, we find 
that the size of the created inter-firm network through membership in several RJVs is 
an important driver. Our results show that large horizontal networks are most prone to 
collusion in the product market. This contrasts with the results for vertical RJVs, 
which lead to efficiency gains that are increasing with the size of the vertical network.  
Specifically, we estimate the critical size above which our test identifies 
collusion. This occurs when the formed network includes more than 18% of direct 
competitors. Empirically, 29% of our sample with a strictly positive horizontal 
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network value falls above that critical threshold. This corresponds to 198 out of 678 
unique firms which at any time participated in horizontal RJVs.  
In terms of policy, this finding is rather worrisome as it suggests that a large 
number of firms create networks that are above the identified critical point, thereby 
enabling collusion in the product market and leading to a reduction in consumer 
surplus. The results of this paper, therefore, have some significant implications for 
competition policy vis-à-vis research cooperations. First, the likelihood of collusion in 
the product market is significant and depends on the type and the size of the created 
network. This suggests that a per se approach to RJVs is unlikely to lead to an 
efficient enforcement regime. In particular, our findings suggest that an effects-based 
approach for large horizontal networks created through RJV-participation is 
appropriate.  
Second, even those RJVs that are below the critical network size may lead to 
collusion in the product market. In this case, the efficiencies are large enough to 
compensate any possible collusive effects in terms of market share, so that consumers 
are better off. From the welfare perspective, these RJVs would in principle not be 
problematic since the standard in antitrust – in the US as well as Europe – is 
consumer surplus. However, collusion is a hard-core violation and thus illegal per se. 
In that sense, competition policy may have a challenge here from the legal perspective 
to the extent that product market collusion and R&D efficiencies may both occur, 
leading the net effect on consumers to be positive.  
In terms of future research, a natural next step of this approach would be to 
investigate how the intensity of RJV-links influences the likelihood of collusion. 
Some firms meet each other several times across different RJVs, which clearly further 
facilitates possibilities to coordinate on product market cooperation.  
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Appendix: Industry-Wide Network Variable 
We construct an alternative measure of research networks, based on both direct and 
indirect links among competitors. In particular, we propose a network variable which 
represents the percentage of firms in a given industry involved in at least one 
horizontal RJV. This measure thus accounts for the possibility that firms can also 
potentially collaborate towards collusion via indirect contacts. As such, it can be seen 
as a network definition that lies at the other end of the spectrum. Indeed, whereas our 
main network variable counts only direct links –and is thus the most narrow– the 
proposed network measure in this section is the broadest possible. Clearly, if many 
firms in an industry are directly linked, i.e. when the network is dense, then our two 
measures should coincide. As can be seen from Figure 3, the new distribution is 
shown to be similar to our initial network variable, although less skewed to the left; 
see also the values for the variable “coverage” in Tables 1, 2a and 2b.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
We estimate the same equation as in (3), but using this alternative network variable. 
The results obtained are very much in line with our main findings (see Figure 4); the 
critical network size above which market shares of participating firms are 
significantly negative can be found at K**=0.16. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Market share (MSimt) Firm i’s market share in its primary SIC4 industry in a given year t. The market share for firm i in industry 
m at time t is 
1
(   ) / (   )mtNimt imt imt imt imtiMS total sales foreign sales total sales foreign sales   ¦ , where Nm is the number 
of firms in industry m. All sales are in million US $. 
RJV Anyimt Dummy equal to 1 if firm i participates in at least one RJV at year t.  
RJV Verticalimt Dummy equal to 1 if firm i participates in at least one RJV at year t, but it does not meet any competitor, 
where competitor is defined as a firm with the same primary SIC4. 
RJV Horizontalimt Dummy equal to 1 if firm i participates in at least one RJV with at least one competitor at year t, where 
competitor is defined as a firm with the same primary SIC4. 
Total Assetsit Firm i’s total assets in year t, in million US $.  
R&Dit Firm i’s yearly R&D expenses, in million US $.  
Patent stockit Firm i’s cumulated patents at year t, calculated as Patent stockit = (1-0.15) Patent stock it-1 + Patents 
applicationit (see e.g. Hall, 1990, and Griliches and Mairesse, 1984). 
Network (RNimt) Number of links with SIC4 competitors through RJV participation, over the total number of possible links 
in the same SIC4. 
Coveragemt  Percentage of the firms in the same SIC4 industry which are connected via RJV participation. 
R&D_Industrymt Industry average yearly R&D expenditures  at the SIC4 level, in million US $. 
MarketValue_Industrymt Average yearly market value at the SIC4 level, in million US $.  
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Table 2a: Preliminary statistics for different categories of RJV participants versus non-participants 
         No RJV   Any RJV   Vertical RJV Horizontal RJV 
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Market Share 0.0730 0.1557 0.1491 0.2182 0.2268 0.2643 0.0984 0.1630 
Total Assets 1,119.0000 9,337.2140 8,688.5660 29,988.5100 6825,3960 24,392.0400 9,908.0010 33,090.1700 
R&D Expenditures 2.5932 32.0338 144.1250 548.0336 70,5578 234.1988 192.1945 674.5062 
Patent stock 3.8045 85.3941 150.8789 523.1952 124,7769 422.3369 167.9342 579.1164 
# Horiz. RJVs - - 2.6053 8.3426 - - 4.0273   10.2926 
Horizontal Network - - - - - - 0.1478 0.1839 
Coverage - - - - - - 0.1781 0.1388 
Obs. 59,996 5,987 2,366 3,621 
 
 
Table 2b: Preliminary statistics for horizontal networks in different size classes 
 Small Medium-sized        Large 
Variable  mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Market Share 0.0432 0.0988 0.0950 0.1540 0.1604 0.2056 
Total Assets 13,014.5500 45,145.3700 5,260.0830 10,280.2500 16,100.7300 45,206.5600 
R&D Expenditures 97.8843 291.1504 145.7234 522.6698 379.4984 1,068.5290 
Patent stock 92.5980 303.9908 170.6768 651.2230 237.7822 625.1998 
# Horiz. RJVs 1.6674 2.1588 2.7189 4.5967 9.0055 18.5320 
Horizontal Network 0.0174 0.0080 0.0918 0.0468 0.3900 0.2213 
Coverage 0.0958 0.0631 0.1499 0.0833 0.3166 0.1781 
Obs. 905 1,811  905 
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Table 3: Instruments for RJV participation 
Dependent Variable 
 
 
Any  
RJV 
 
Vertical  
RJV 
 
Horizontal 
RJV 
 
Horizontal 
Network-Small 
 
Horizontal 
Network-Med. 
 
Horizontal 
Network– Large 
 
Estimation Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
       
  
Patent stockt-3  0.0040*** -0.0005**  0.0016**  0.0015***  0.0016**  0.0022*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
        
Log(Total Assets)t-3 0.520*** 0.179*** 0.477*** 0.269*** 0.404*** 0.493*** 
  (0.0471) (0.0315) (0.0470) (0.0433) (0.0369) (0.0838) 
        
Log(R&D)t-3 0.457*** 0.202*** 0.375*** 0.339*** 0.400*** 0.675*** 
  (0.0532) (0.0470) (0.0469) (0.0659) (0.0500) (0.110) 
        
Log(R&D)_Industryt-1 0.958*** 0.197** 0.867*** 0.148 0.610*** 1.440*** 
  (0.111) (0.0847) (0.111) (0.120) (0.0960) (0.196) 
        
Log(MarketValue)_Industryt-1 -0.106* -0.111** -0.150*** -0.494*** -0.0687 0.296** 
  (0.0600) (0.0563) (0.0572) (0.0901) (0.0617) (0.122) 
        
Constant -9.758*** -6.136*** -8.290*** 2.318*** 2.329*** 3.310*** 
  (0.411) (0.264) (0.410) (0.0430) (0.0410) (0.0512) 
       
  
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
 Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
  
Obs. 30,419 30,419 28,577 29,389 28,676 28,676 
We show regressions for all our RJV participation measures. We use a panel probit estimation methodology given the dichotomous nature of our 
participation variables (any RJV, vertical RJV, horizontal RJV, small horizontal network, medium horizontal network, and large horizontal 
network). In all specifications we control for the other exogenous regressors from our main specification and add firm random effects and year 
dummies. 
 33
 
Table 4: Effect of patent stock on firms’ market shares in industries with no RJVs 
Dependent Variable  
 
MS 
 
MS 
 
MS 
 
Estimation Method System GMM System GMM System GMM 
MSt-1        0.9610***       0.9622***      0.9631*** 
 (0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0307) 
Patent stockt-1 0.00004   
 (0.00008)   
Patent stockt-2  0.00006  
  (0.00008)  
Patent stockt-3   0.00008 
   (0.00009) 
Cumul. Log(R&D) effect    -0.0237**    -0.0243**    -0.0247** 
 (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
Log(Market Value)_Industryt-1 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Log(R&D)_Industryt-1      0.0335*** 0.0340***     0.0344*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0116) 
Constant -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0008 
  (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) 
Sargan test (Prob > chi2) 
 
0.1247 
(57) 
0.136 
(57) 
0.1435 
(57) 
Arellano-Bond test (Prob > z) 0.761 0.7666 0.7696 
Obs. 43,600 43,600 43,600 
We report System GMM estimates of the market share equation in the sample of industries with no RJVs. MS, and Log(R&D expenses) are treated as endogenous. For space 
reasons, only the cumulative effects of Log(R&D) are reported, which represents the sum of the effects from time t to time t-2. Windmeijer robust standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity are stated in parentheses. We report the p-value of the Hansen-Sargan J test, where the degrees of freedom are in parentheses, and the p-value for the Arellano-
Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. 
Table 5: RJV participation on market shares 
  RJV any Horiz. vs. Vertical Horizontal Network
Dependent Variable  
 
MS MS MS 
Estimation Method System GMM System GMM System GMM 
MS
 t-1 0.951*** 0.914*** 0.913*** 
 (0.0315) (0.0506) (0.0595) 
Cumul. RJV effect - Any 0.00185   
 (0.0058)   
Cumul. RJV effect - Vertical  0.0337** 0.0467** 
  (0.0198) (0.0297) 
Cumul. RJV effect - Horizontal  -0.0017  
  (0.0057)  
Cumul. Netw. effect – Horiz. -Small   0.0043 
   (0.0078) 
Cumul. Netw. effect - Horiz. -Medium   -0.0093* 
   (0.0054) 
Cumul. Netw. effect - Horiz. -Large   -0.0282** 
   (0.0135) 
Cumul. Log(R&D) effect -0.0039 -0.0008 -0.0002 
 (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0002) 
Log(Market Value)_Industryt-1 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Log(R&D)_Industryt-1 0.0020 0.0027 0.0027 
 (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0023) 
Constant -0.0023 -0.0020 0.0006 
 (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0026) 
Hansen-Sargan J test (Prob > chi2)  
 
0.6781 
(116) 
0.7839 
(123) 
0.5609 
(233) 
Arellano-Bond test (Prob > z) 0.9299 0.6829 0.5609 
Obs. 36,593 36,593 36,593 
We report System GMM estimates of equation (3). MS, RJV participation variables, and Log(R&D) are treated as 
endogenous. For space reasons, only cumulative effects of RJV participation and Log(R&D) are reported, which 
represent the sum of the effects from time t to time t-2. Windmeijer robust standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity are stated in parentheses. We report the p-value of the Hansen-Sargan J test, where the degrees of 
freedom are in parentheses, and the p-value for the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced 
errors. 
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Table 6: Vertical networks on market shares 
Dep. Var. MS 
Estimation Method System GMM 
MS
 t-1 0.903*** 
 
(0.0531) 
Cumul. RJV effect - Horizontal 
-0.00522 
 (0.00562) 
Cumul. Netw. effect – Vertical - small 
-0.0015 
 (0.0151) 
Cumul. Netw. effect - Vertical - medium 0.0460** 
 (0.0228) 
Cumul. Netw. effect - Vertical - large 0.0368* 
 0.(0210) 
Cumul. log(R&D) effect -0.0011 
 (0.0011) 
Log(Market Value)_Industryt-1 0.0003 
 (0.0004) 
Log(R&D)_Industryt-1 0.0024 
 (0.0024) 
Constant -0.0023 
 (0.0024) 
Hansen-Sargan J test (Prob > chi2)  
 
0.8084 
(159) 
Arellano-Bond test (Prob > z) 0.8289 
Obs. 36,563 
We report System GMM estimates of equation (3) where we differentiate the 
effect of vertical RJVs depending on their size. MS, RJV participation 
variables, and Log(R&D) are treated as endogenous. For space reasons, only 
cumulative effects of RJV participation and Log(R&D) are reported, which 
represent the sum of the effects from time t to time t-2. Windmeijer robust 
standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are stated in parentheses. We 
report the p-value of the Hansen-Sargan J test, where the degrees of freedom 
are in parentheses, and the p-value for the Arellano-Bond test for zero 
autocorrelation in first-differenced errors.  
 
Table 7: Critical network size and welfare assessment 
SIC4 Industry Description Year % Firms  
above K* 
# Firms 
above K* 
# Firms in 
industry 
2840 Soap, Detergents, Perfumes, Cosmetics 1999 0.3333 3 9 
2911 Petroleum Refining 1999 0.1875 6 32 
3312 Steel Works, Blast Furnaces (including Coke Ovens), and Rolling Mills 1998 0.2188 7 32 
3510 Engines and Turbines 1996 0.4286 3 7 
3559 Special Industry Machinery 1999 0.3818 21 55 
3571 Electronic Computers 1991 0.4706 16 34 
3572 Computer Storage Devices 1997 0.2059 7 34 
3576 Computer Communications Equipment 1996 0.1944 14 72 
4011 Railroads, Line-Haul Operating 1994 0.2174 5 23 
4841 Cable and Other Pay Television Services 1992 0.2286 8 35 
The variable % Firms above K* represents the percentage of firms in a given industry/year that participate in horizontal RJVs and 
reach a network size larger than K*. The variable # Firms above K* represents the number of firms that form a horizontal 
network larger than K*. The variable # Firms in industry represents the number of firms in a given industry/year. 
 
Figure 1: Size distribution of horizontal networks 
 
 
Figure 2: Market share impact of participation in horizontal networks: 
Discrete (three size classes) and Continuous Effects 
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Figure 3: Size distribution of industry-wide networks 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Market share impact of  of participation in horizontal networks, 
Industry-wide network variable 
 
